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ABSTRACT 
Early on, the classics of management and organisational science created 
and dreamt up organizational worlds and operating systems capable of high 
performance with the given resources. In theory, the system works perfectly but in 
reality there are only a handful of exceptional success stories on this field. They 
are the unconventional organisations (Németh, 2009). In my opinion, some of 
the reasons of such failure include the errors, mistakes and biases in the decision 
making process. I am going to present some in the current study to better understand 
and raise awareness for such phenomena. This is the next step for better and more 
efficient organisation. 
1. Introduct ion 
Over the past centuries, organisational and management science has long 
reached the limit on the level of models and approaches where we more or less 
have a clear theoretical understanding as to how more efficient production may 
be reached. What works perfectly and logically in theory can, however, hardly 
ever be accomplished in practice, much less in a sustainable manner and in a long 
term. Due to limitations of space, my short study only illustrates that the classical 
authors of scientific management have reached a sort of high emission level that 
seems to be optimum in terms of resources. In the second half of the study, I name 
the thinking pattern of the human factor (perception and decision making biases) 
as one of the reasons for errors and under-performance. I started off with some 
basic works on economic behaviour and its special (by that I mean irrational or 
those that appear irrational to outsiders) such as Katona (1951), McGuire (1971), 
Scitovsky (1990) or Ariely (2011). 
2. A short history of the early per iod of m a n a g e m e n t sc ience 
The first clear signs of business related management and organisational issues 
surfaced with corporations in the 19th century after the Industrial Revolution. The 
priorities of management and organisational science have changed frequently over 
time with each period outlining different needs. Back then the key issues of organi-
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sation focused on production with production policies as well as centralised pro-
duction control and design functions. 
Since the 1930s, the system of social relations and the issue of human motivation 
were of primary imporance to be followed by operational research. Beginning in 
the 1940s, leveraging research for military purposes aimed at the quantification of 
decision issues (feasible for short-term well-structured tasks). The 1950s brought 
about the period of system analysis, the development of economic cybernetics and 
system behaviour on the whole. The new trend that began in the 1960s was coined 
with the terms strategic planning and strategic management. Strategic planning 
was needed because managers were faced with badly structured decisions and, for 
the most part, they made their decisions intuitively. Later it was replaced by total 
strategic management with organisational changes and corporate culture as the 
key values. Beginning in the 1980s, Japanese management methods focusing on 
quality brought along new ordering principles. The cognitive approach of the past 
decade has placed the emphasis on understanding the human thought process; the 
discovery of the information processing mechanism in the brain (earlier Barnard or 
Simon, later Winckens and Rasmussen (all quoted by Izsó, 1997)); the elimination 
of the errors of thinking and making judgements and a better understanding and 
improvement of complex decision making processes. Decision support systems 
have become available for everyday use both on the hardware and the software 
sides. These tools help decision makers avoid making certain typical mistakes in 
terms of human perception and decision making; however, they do not completely 
solve those issues. 
2.1 T h e classics of Scient i f ic M a n a g e m e n t : the era of Taylor, Favor, 
and W e b e r ( 1 8 8 0 - 1 9 2 0 ) 
The first scientific studies of the second half of the 19th century were written by 
authors like Charles Babbage, who highlighted the importance of the human factor 
and the usefulness of division of labour. An example: "The Babbage Principle says 
that labour costs can be lowered by employing a diversified workforce qualified 
for the specific tasks;" (Kieser, 1995). 
The classical trend emerged around the turn of the 20th century. This trend basi-
cally includes three schools: Scientific Management, Administrative and Structur-
alist approach (Kieser, 1995). 
Scientific Management was born in the United States and formulated general 
rules for the organisation of work.This school's objective is to organise work to 
allow employees perform their best. The founders of this school were Frederich W. 
Taylor as well as Frank and Lillian Gilbreth (Taylor, 1983). 
Due to the recession, F. W. Taylor (1856-1915) had to begin to work as a day 
labourer despite his qualifications in 1878. He climbed up the ladder quickly as he 
proved to be an excellent skilled worker. He earned his engineer degree in night 
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school and in few years' time he became the factory's chief engineer. The observa-
tions he made in various positions led to the results attained in the latter phases 
of his career. His book is based on the 30 years he spent observing and experi-
menting. As an industrial engineer, he was preoccupied with labour efficiency. He 
discovered a phenomenon he later called "soldiering". (Later social psychology 
research has confirmed the existence of the phenomena of social slacking (Latane, 
Williams and Harking 1979), the free-rider phenomenon (Stoebe and Frey, 1982) 
and the Ringelmann type (Kravitz and Martin, 1986) coordination loss (Steiner 
1972, 1976) (they are quoted by Wilke and van Knippenberg, 1997). He is known 
for the rationalisation of corporate activities, the formulation of the design and 
management background, the principle of functional masters (assigning leaders to 
subtasks), the principle of time and motion studies and for the development of the 
motivation system based on wage benefits. 
Taylor examined all jobs and roles and identified the most efficient way they 
can be carried out. He introduced the system of product wage. He redesigned job 
descriptions and introduced rest periods. He later quit and became an independent 
consultant. His methods improved performance and morale. His system is built up 
from four different steps. 
First step: The manager first has to develop all elements of the specific job, 
i.e. study the specific work and identify the method of work to replace the previ-
ous "rule of thumb". Second step: The manager has to select, train and educate 
employees on a scientific basis as opposed to the earlier system when everyone 
picked his/her job and studied wherever and however it was possible. To avoid 
that, training for jobs has to be standardised (reference to the Babbage principle). 
Third step: The manager has to 'kindly' cooperate with the workers to facilitate 
working methods developed on the basis of scientific principles. This will allow 
the manager to ascertain that the workers have accepted the 'one best way' . By 
doing so, he recognised that man is not simply a 'biorobot' , yet he rather despised 
manual labourers and considered them unintelligent. Fourth step: The manager 
has to take on design and organisation responsibilities to allow workers to carry 
out their tasks. This latter principle clearly separate white and blue collar workers. 
Other members of the Scientific Management movement included F. Gilbreth, 
who used the now classic example of a bricklayer to illustrate the rationalisation of 
masonry. He was primarily interested in the welfare of workers. At the same time, 
he established the technical foundations for the filming version of motion study. 
As a deputy of Taylor, Henry Gantt developed the 'Gantt chart', which uses a chart 
format to allow a more easier understanding and analysis of task scheduling. 
Critics of Scientific Management pointed out the lack of experiments, the low 
number of observations, and samples being taken without statistical means. It is a 
fact easy to observe that a systematic wasting of workers' expertise causes prob-
lems. Increasing product range and innovation rates necessitate the hiring of more 
workers with higher skills. The job description, therefore, should be broadened. 
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During the same period in Europe, the Harzburger Model (Kieser, 1995, p. 210) 
presented an alternative to the management theory based on the following princi-
ples: The decision is made by the employee to whom it belongs. Employees are led 
by managers within the overall framework of company objectives. Superiors may 
only make a decision if by doing so their subordinates would cross their lines of 
authority. The basic principles regulating the relationships of colleagues have to be 
put in writing and enforced to avoid misunderstandings. Job descriptions provide 
a detailed list of the responsibilities of workers. Due to its narrow and inflexible 
framework, this model was replaced by the MbO concept (management by objec-
tives) where "each worker should negotiate with their superior". As Peters and 
Waterman (1986) explained in their book, this is a more flexible approach. 
The Administrative Management school of thought focused on the organisa-
tional structure as opposed to the Scientific Management school, which is more 
interested in the works of individual employees. This school is represented by 
Henri Fayol (1841-1925)(Fayol 1984), who developed a number of management 
principles he believed were universal and increased management effectiveness. 
These principles include the following: Division of Work, Authority-Responsi-
bility, Discipline, Unity of Command, Unity of Direction, Subordination of Indi-
vidual Interest to the General Interest, Remuneration, Centralisation, Scalar Chain, 
Order, Equity, Stability of Tenure of Personnel, Initiative, Espirit de Corps. 
Fayol outlined the elements of management in the context of planning, organis-
ing, direct leading (commanding), coordinating, and controlling. This trend was 
never as popular as that of Taylor. (Taylor 1984; Bakacsi 1996; Klein 2001) Other 
authors from the era such as Chester Barnard contributed to the understanding of 
the distribution of authority and power within the organisation. Mary P. Follett 
was active in the fields of setting objectives and conflict management (Jones and 
George, 2002), Lyndall Urwick, and Gulick tried to integrate the central principles 
of scientific management with the concept of administrative management (Weber 
1967, Horváth 1999, p. 46). 
The most well-known representative of the Structuralist school (formalist organ-
isational theory) is Max Weber (1864-1920) (Weber 1967), one of the greatest 
figures of modem civilian sociology, who identified the concept of bureaucracy. 
Weber outlined his own principles on the division of work, competencies, norms, 
hierarchy, and documenting. He even identified management typologies, including 
three types of managers, i.e. patriarchal, charismatic and bureaucratic. 
Weber's bureaucratic management method is characterised by clearly regu-
lated bureaucratic division of work; solid regulation of authorities and distribu-
tion of commanding authorities; the principle of bureaucratic hierarchy and ser-
vice path; written documentation of administrative activities; creating an office 
staff responsible for document storage and management; enforcing the principle 
of professionalism requiring qualifications for all specific bureaucratic activities; 
office posts occupied by full-time clerks whose performance is measured with 
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formal and impersonal procedures; changes in personnels do not affect perfor-
mance requirements; bureaucratic work is carried out along universal, more or less 
recorded, comprehensible and learnable rules whose knowledge and enforcement 
are expected from clerks; clerks can exercise their impersonal and regulated power 
independently (autonomously); clerks fulfilling their duties receive clearly speci-
fied remuneration: fixed wage, promotion process, increased wage and authority, 
guaranteed pay after retirement. 
Weber believes that the advantage of the bureaucratic management model is 
that, due to its nature, it guarantees accurate, quick, economical, cheap, objective 
and professional administration. This is a formal model (Zeller, 1995). 
Criticism inspiring to further develop the bureaucracy model: organisations are 
different and , therefore, no general description may be applied to them. Techni-
cally speaking, they are efficient only under special circumstances, which need to 
be identified in each and every case. Every single organisation shows some charac-
teristics of dysfunctionality that reduce efficiency. According to Merton, it is first 
and foremost the structure of bureaucracy that prevents the system being efficient 
(Merton, 1980). Other disfunctional elements may include the archives character-
istic causing cumbersome and slow operation, excessive increase of regulations 
and conflicts raised between specialists and bureaucrats (Merton, 1988). 
We have not yet talked about the father of mass production even though he had 
played a crucial part in advancing scientific management in the right direction. He 
was Henry Ford and his organisational principles were called Fordism (Kieser, 
1995; Klein, 1998). Fordism was more of a production control and organisational 
system rather than a system of management principles. Ordering and systematic 
arrangement to ensure that materials have to travel the shortest possible distance. 
His theory on forwarding transport facilities, tools and finished work pieces, the 
first use of assembly lines, the broad-scale standardisation of products, and the 
exchangeability of parts are the main areas where Henry Ford left a lasting imprint. 
In summary, if scientific management had developed only this far, we would 
have a relatively well operating system. We can talk about organisations operating 
on the basis of rational organisational processes and along the job descriptions of 
individual contributors (employees), which somewhat fit their individual objec-
tives (because they consulted with their superiors based on MbO). Employees are 
selected and trained for the specific tasks based on their competencies (the right 
person to the right position). Managers think long-term and are real managers 
because they understand and know what their managerial tasks entail. Commu-
nication channels are well-defined: everyone sends and receives data and infor-
mation required for the perfect completion of their work. Nowadays, if a com-
pany can be characterised by the above, it is considered a sought-after workplace 
by employees. The question is why such a workplace cannot be established even 
though we have known the principles for almost a century. 
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3. W h y do we m a k e decis ions only a lmost rat ional ly? 
The section below is a sort of subjective collection of perception and decision 
biases that affect the implementation of the rationally operatingn system described 
above. Rationally designed systems are implemented by specifically rational peo-
ple. Simon (1959) was one of the first authors to write about the limited rational 
operation of man, the one I previously described as specifically rational. Accept-
ing the fact that man is by nature a creature with limited rationality meant a huge 
leap compared to the completely rational image of man represented by econom-
ics before. Back then it seemed that the fight is futile because it is impossible to 
find a system in an individual's decision making mechanism. This is so because 
seemingly irrational actions can be found when observing an individual because 
there are subjective decisions in the background. It is crucial to understand that 
individuals hardly ever see themselves irrational, i.e. from within everyone is com-
pletely rational as most of the time their decision making biases remain invisible. 
In terms of discovering the topic and locating the underlying system, co-authors 
Tversky and Kahneman have made valuable contributions (see their recommended 
works in the comment). The current scientific opinion is somewhat comforting in 
that these biases and distortions are not simply irrational but may be mapped out 
because they are regular and predictable (Ariely, 2011). 
As for our topic, we have to distinguish between experience and expertise 
because the blurred limits between the two often result in significant slips in the 
world of organisations. Experience is defined based on the feedback loop with its 
repetitive presence, which is not sufficient by itself to reduce the impacts of biases 
(Neale and Northcraft, 1989). Expertise, however, involves recognition of the fac-
tors limiting one's rationality, which the literature calls General Bias Awareness 
(Kaufmann, Carter & Buhrmann, 2010). So the people we need to build a better 
future and a more efficient and perfect organisation and to lead the way are man-
agement and decision making professionals. 
Cognitive biases are similar to optical illusions according to Pohl (1994). The 
decisive factors of their similarity involve deviance from normative standard, sys-
tematic deviations (i.e. not random but predictable differences). They happen inad-
vertently and automatically and, as a result, they are really hard to avoid. What do 
these cognitive biases entail? Piatelli-Palmarini (1994) summarised them using 
the following eight characteristics: General, systematic, directional, specific, being 
influenced from outside, hard to correct, hard to transfer, furthermore, independent 
from intelligence and qualifications. Publications have identified over 60 different 
biases and errors (Groth, Lubin and Sprung 2012). Focusing on business deci-
sion makers, Bazerman (2006), following the footsteps of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1973), lists 13 systematic, intuitive biases that are recurrent and robust in terms of 
the frequency they are committed. 
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Availability heuristics Anchoring 
Basic frequency error Confirmation error 
Insensitivity to the volume of the sample Design error 
Disregarding regression to the average Retrospective bias 
Conjunction mistake 
This list is easy to be supplemented with the most frequent biases represented in 
financial decisions such as overconfidence (Bazerman, 2006), the impact of self-
attributing bias (which is known as basic attribution error by social psychology 
(Heider, Simmel, 1981)) or representational heuristics. 
The excellent study by Busenitz and Barney (1997) pinpoint differences in the 
decision making processes of different groups of decision makers (managers of 
corporations and those of SMBs). Corporate decision makers with better struc-
tured and professional decision making processes were less exposed to heuristics 
and biases than entrepreneurs. 
3.1 Decis ions are indeed needed for organisat ions 
Through their members, organisations have to be able to adapt to their changing 
environment as the rule of evolution in the world of organisations put it (Csanádi 
et al 2010). Decision making errors can be found at virtually any level of organi-
sations. These errors are made by individuals as well as groups (the phenomenon 
of 'group thinking', Janis, 1971). Groups do not protect you from the errors of 
decision making but because of group dynamics, they actually make the system 
even more complicated. There are biases and errors visible in everyday decision 
making situations as well as on a strategic level. With regards to the organisational 
world, we cannot talk about pure decisions because the organisational culture and 
the organisational politics related to that significantly influence the perception and 
decision making repertoire of the person making the decision. We live in it and 
thus we are mostly blind to the operational motives of our own culture. 
3.2 W h a t ' s w r o n g with intuit ive decis ions? 
Basically nothing except that they are hard to reproduce. A system that tries to 
be self-sustaining, attempts to leam what keeps it alive and, in an ideal case, also 
tries to copy decisions. If a process can only be explained on the level of emotions, 
then the copying system is in trouble because it can only work with incomprehen-
sible subjective factors. Systems prefer rational, repeatable and justifiable pro-
cesses that can be derived mathematically because this is what can be copied and 
reproduced easily to maintain quality. Anticipation and intuition can significantly 
help managers and decision makers. However, other members of the system expect 
explanations right after the decision which they can understand. 
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4. 'Deb ias ing ' offers a solut ion 
The literature uses the term 'debiasing' to reduce the impact of cognitive biases 
on decisions (Bazerman 2006). The term refers to processes and techniques 
designed to allow the decision maker to mitigate or event prevent the impacts of 
cognitive biases in the decision making process. 
It was also Bazerman (2006) who categorised such attempts and methods into 5 
large categories: (1) acquiring experience and expertise; (2) analogous reasoning; 
(3) assuming an outside perspective; (4) replacing human decisions with linear 
models and other statistical means; (5) understanding biases in other people's deci-
sions. 
While making a proposal to change the decision making strategy, he lists 3 criti-
cal steps: (1) clarification of the presence of specific decision making errors; (2) 
identification of the causes and sources of errors, i.e. understanding the bias and 
heuristics; (3) ensuring that the decision maker would not take the identification 
of these errors as offence against their self-esteem. Since Goffman (1999) we have 
known how important an operation is to maintain the face of the individual, espe-
cially when that person is a manager. 
The most efficiently operating organisations like Toyota, which is regarded as 
the company that depends on Taylorist principles the most (Liker, 2004), have 
found the perfect path of building the organisation and this path may even be one 
of those described by the 'classics'. However, managers of all modern and suc-
cessful companies agree that now we know more about man as an individual, as a 
group member and as a member of an organisation. And it is really worth using this 
knowledge. For instance, as to how we create a productive and sustainable organi-
sational culture based on working organisational values, how we can motive and 
keep talented people in the long run or how we can help our colleagues to make 
less intuitive and more rational decisions. 
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